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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury convicted Mr. Beyer of attempted strangulation of his former girlfriend,
Ms. McConnell.

Two errors infected that verdict.

First, the district court allowed Officer

Cooper to testify to what Ms. McConnell’s children told him on the day of the incident, after
incorrectly concluding that Mr. Beyer had implied that Ms. McConnell’s children had fabricated
their testimony. Second, the prosecutor committed misconduct at closing by telling the jury that
Mr. Beyer had lied to them and by misstating Mr. Beyer’s testimony. Because the trial came
down to who the jury believed—Ms. McConnell and her children or Mr. Beyer—these errors are
not harmless. This Court should vacate Mr. Beyer’s judgment of conviction and remand for a
new trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Beyer with attempted strangulation related to an altercation
between him and Ms. McConnell.

(R., pp.8–9, 44–45.)

At trial, Ms. McConnell,

Ms. McConnell’s twelve-year-old daughter, MM, Ms. McConnell’s fourteen-year-old son, AO,
and Mr. Beyer testified about the altercation itself. They testified consistently with one another
about most of what happened that day, up until just before the altercation took place.
The four planned on going down to Quinn’s Pond so that Ms. McConnell and the kids
could swim and kayak while Mr. Beyer went for a bike ride on the green belt. (Tr.,1 p.142,
L.17–p.143, L.20, p.184, L.16–p.185, L.16, p.309, Ls.1–21, p.380, L.9–p.381, L.10.) Mr. Beyer
testified that, before he left for Quinn’s Pond on his bike, he gave AO directions and watched as
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Citations to “Tr.,” refer to the transcript containing the trial and sentencing hearings.
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AO loaded the kayak on top of Ms. McConnell’s car. (Tr., p.382, L.8–p.383, L.1.) By the time
Ms. McConnell and her children got to Quinn’s Pond, Ms. McConnell was mad because the kids
weren’t listening to her and she had gotten lost. (Tr., p.160, L.18–p.162, L.8, p.200, L.3–p.201,
L.2, p.310, L.20–p.313, L.23, p.384, L.9–p.385, L.16.) Ms. McConnell made MM cry a little bit.
(Tr., p.161, Ls.17–19, p.201, Ls.15–16, p.312, Ls.18–25, p.384, Ls.19–25.) As they were getting
ready to head home, Ms. McConnell yelled at her kids in a way that embarrassed Mr. Beyer.
(Tr., p.162, L.22–p.163, L.10, p.202, L.17–p.203, L.13, p.315, L.1–p.316, L.15, p.386, L.25–
p.390, L.1.) He said something to her about it, which only made matters worse. (Tr., p.163,
Ls.2–10, p.316, L.12–p.317, L.2, p.388, L.19–p.390, L.11.) Mr. Beyer decided to bike home,
leaving Ms. McConnell and the kids to load the kayak back onto the car by themselves.
(Tr., p.163, Ls.12–17, p.317, Ls.3–15, p.390, Ls.12–21.)

When Mr. Beyer got back home,

Ms. McConnell was mad at him and told him to get out of the house. (Tr., p.164, Ls.4–16,
p.186, Ls.16–22, p.203, L.11–p.204, L.11, p.318, L.14–p.319, L.8, p.391, Ls.17–21.) This is
where the respective parties’ stories begin to diverge.
According to Mr. Beyer, he did not initially pack up to leave because he was trying to
figure out what had happened and wanted to give Ms. McConnell some time to calm down.
(Tr., p.391, L.22–p.392, L.18.)

When Ms. McConnell again said to get out of the house,

Mr. Beyer said he would get his things and leave, but Ms. McConnell told him he could not take
his things. (Tr., p.392, L.25–p.393, L.9.) Ms. McConnell then told him she was going to change
the password to the Wi-Fi and that she already had AO take Mr. Beyer’s house key out of his
bag. (Tr., p.393, L.24–p.395, L.25.)
At that point, Mr. Beyer went upstairs to pack his clothes into a duffle bag and
Ms. McConnell followed.

(Tr., p.396, Ls.1–18.)
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The two fought over the duffle bag—

Ms. McConnell threw it off of the bed and then sat down on the bed, after which Mr. Beyer put
the bag on top of her and she again threw it off. (Tr., p.397, L.4–p.400, L.4.) MM did not go
upstairs initially, but went upstairs a while later when Ms. McConnell called her into the room
and then yelled at AO to call the police. (Tr., p.396, L.8–p.404, L.4.) A minute later, MM left
the room as Mr. Beyer stood in front of his closet, with his back to Ms. McConnell, loading his
things into the duffle bag. (Tr., p.404, L.5–p.407, L2.) Ms. McConnell said she was going to
help him pack faster and “body-checked” him as she started pulling clothing off of hangers,
almost causing him to fall over.2 (Tr., p.406, L.11–p.409, L.14.) Mr. Beyer said that “the best
way I can describe it is a body check. I can feel her on my back and pushing me at the same time
while I’m bent over. . . .” (Tr., p.408, Ls.10–12.) He turned around, placed his left hand on her
shoulder and right hand on her collar bone, and began to push her out of the room. (Tr., p.410,
L.1–p.411, L.18.) Ms. McConnell started clawing at his chest and they both fell over, him
landing on top of her. (Tr., p.411, L.17–p.412, L.19.) When that happened, Mr. Beyer heard
MM gasp. (Tr., p.413, L.22–p.414, L.6.) Mr. Beyer testified that he did not physically provoke
Ms. Connell when she body-checked him, did not try to strangle or choke her, and did not try to
throw her to the ground. (Tr., p.409, L.15–p.411, L.7, p.412, L.20–p.413, L.10.)
When Mr. Beyer went to get up, Ms. McConnell grabbed his headphones from around his
neck, tore them apart, and dropped them on the ground. (Tr., p.414, Ls.7–24.) After Mr. Beyer
got up, he saw Ms. McConnell grabbing at her neck as though she was in pain, and he asked if
she wanted him to call 911. (Tr., p.416, L.15–p.417, L.5.) She said “no,” and MM told
Mr. Beyer that AO already called the police. (Tr., p.416, L.24–p.417, L.5.)

2

On cross-examination, Mr. Beyer acknowledged that he told Officer Cooper that
Ms. McConnell had jumped on his back and that it was possible he had said Ms. McConnell had
clawed at him at that time. (Tr., p.431, L.14–p.433, L.24.)
3

Ms. McConnell and MM went downstairs, and Mr. Beyer went back to packing up his
clothes. (Tr., p.418, Ls.1–3.) As he was packing, MM came back upstairs and grabbed the
pieces of his headphones without saying anything. (Tr., p.418, Ls.4–10.) Ms. McConnell also
went back upstairs to turn the Wi-Fi router off and back on, which was necessary to reset the
password. (Tr., p.418, Ls.11–21.) By the time that the police got there, Mr. Beyer had packed
all of his clothing, leaving his closet empty. (Tr., p.419, L.22–p.421, L.16.) In the police photos
of the bedroom, however, some of his clothing was back in his closet and the duffle bag was not
where he had left it. (Tr., p.420, L.14–p.421, L.4.) Mr. Beyer therefore testified that it appeared
someone had rehung some of his clothing. (Tr., p.419, L.22–p.420, L.16.)
Ms. McConnell, on the other hand, said that she, Mr. Beyer, and MM all went upstairs at
the same time while the couple continued arguing and Mr. Beyer changed his clothes.
(Tr., p.319, L.9–p.320, L.22.) After Mr. Beyer said something mean to MM, Ms. McConnell
again told him he needed to leave and Mr. Beyer began packing his duffle bag. (Tr., p.320,
L.23–p.321, L.14.) She denied ever telling him to leave his belongings behind. (Tr., p.347,
L.22–p.348, L.9.) They continued arguing, and Ms. McConnell asked MM to bring her AO’s
cell phone, but decided not to call the police. (Tr., p.322, L.16–p.323, L.7.)
Ms. McConnell said that she eventually went to the closet to help Mr. Beyer pack up his
clothing—and that she did so because she was mad, but she did not push or physically aggress
him—when he picked her up off of the ground by putting his left hand on her neck and right
hand on her arm. 3 (Tr., p.323, L.8–p.324, L.4, p.337, Ls.1–14, p.355, L.14–p.358, L.25.) They
then fell to the ground with him on top of her. (Tr., p.324, Ls.4–21.) He held her down, still
with his left hand on her throat and his right hand on her arm. (Tr., p.324, L.22–p.326, L.5.)
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Ms. McConnell weighed 212 pounds at the time. (Tr., p.258, L.20–p.259, L.2.)
4

Ms. McConnell said that Mr. Beyer applied pressure to her throat and that she felt like she
couldn’t breathe. (Tr., p.326, L.6–p.327, L.4.) Mr. Beyer then got up, asked if she wanted him
to call an ambulance, and then continued packing his bag. (Tr., p.328, Ls.7–25.) She denied
ripping up his headphones. (Tr., p.360, L.17–p.361, L.10.)
Ms. McConnell eventually got up, went downstairs, and learned that AO had called 911.
(Tr., p.329, Ls.1–10.) She testified that she went back upstairs before the police got there to tell
Mr. Beyer that the police were on their way (Tr., p.363, L.21–p.364, L.13), but that she did not
unplug the modem or rehang any of Mr. Beyer’s clothing. (Tr., p.363, L.21–p.364, L.13, p.369,
L.18–p.370, L.7.)
MM and AO generally testified consistently with Ms. McConnell’s version of events.
MM testified that she went upstairs to the master bedroom with Mr. Beyer and Ms. McConnell
(Tr., p.145, L.10–p.146, L.2), that they argued while he packed his bag, (Tr., p.152, L.4–p.154,
L.19), and that MM left the room just briefly when Ms. McConnell asked MM to get her
brother’s cell phone (Tr., p.154, L.23–p.155, L.9). As for the main altercation, MM recounted
that her mom said she was going to help Mr. Beyer move out a little faster when Mr. Beyer
picked her up by the throat and threw her to the ground. (Tr., p.156, Ls.15–24.) MM said that
she saw Mr. Beyer sit on top of her mother with his left hand on her throat and his right hand on
her arm. (Tr., p.157, L.12–p.158, L.11.) MM also testified that she did not pick up the pieces of
Mr. Beyer’s headphones, and that some of his clothes were left in the closet when he was
arrested. (Tr., p.177, L.13–p.178, L.9.)
AO was not upstairs for most of the incident. He testified that when he first walked up
the stairs, he heard Ms. McConnell say she was going to help Mr. Beyer move out faster
followed by the sound of hangers moving and a loud bang. (Tr., p.188, Ls.7–21.) He said that
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after MM went running down the stairs screaming and crying, he saw Mr. Beyer on top of
Ms. McConnell with his left arm on her throat and his right arm on her arm, and then he went
downstairs and called 911. (Tr., p.188, Ls.19–22, p.190, L.7–p.192, L.3.) Before the police got
there, AO took photos of what he described as red marks on Ms. McConnell’s neck and bruises
on her arm. (Tr., p.195, Ls.3–24; see Exs. 8–11.)
Officer Cooper, the primary responding officer, testified to what happened when he got
to the house. He talked to Mr. Beyer, Ms. McConnell, and each of her children individually, and
then decided to arrest Mr. Beyer. (Tr., p.123, L.13–p.124, L.7, p.126, L.21–p.128, L.1.) On
rebuttal, Officer Cooper was allowed to testify, over defense counsel’s hearsay objection, to what
MM and AO had told Officer Cooper that day. (Tr., p.445, L.6–p.446, L.12.) According to
Officer Cooper, MM told him that she saw Mr. Beyer grab her mother, push her to the floor, and
then put one hand on her neck and the other hand on her shoulder. (Tr., p.446, Ls.13–24.) AO
told him that he saw Mr. Beyer with one hand on his mother’s throat and the other on her
shoulder. (Tr., p.446, L.25–p.447, L.11.)
Finally, the doctor and nurse who examined Ms. McConnell the following day testified
that Ms. McConnell reported symptoms of lightheadedness, difficulty breathing and swallowing,
changes in her voice, coughing, and throat pain. (Tr., p.247, L.19–p.252, L.20, p.280, L.13–
p.285, L.5.) The doctor did not see any physical signs of attempted strangulation (Tr., p.264,
L.25–p.266, L.17), but the nurse did note some swelling on the back of her neck (Tr., p.285, L.6–
p.286, L.14).
In her closing arguments, the prosecutor told the jury that because Mr. Beyer was the
only witness who had the benefit of sitting through the other witnesses’ testimony, it should
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conclude that Mr. Beyer had made up his story to fit within theirs. On rebuttal, she came back to
this argument:
The fact that he is present, and it is in every trial. But it is unique to the situation
of people who are testifying to you and haven’t heard what other people have
said. Those people can’t conform their testimony to what others have said to
make these pieces fit together better.
He’s the only one who can do that. And he tried to do it with you. You
know he tried to do it with you. It’s, well, it’s just words you know, she bumped
him, body-checked, jumped on his back. Those aren’t just words. Those are
different stories. And there’s a reason for you getting different stories.
....
But he forgot which lie he told Officer Cooper. And he told you that. He
hadn’t reviewed the audio. He didn’t remember saying that she had jumped on
his back. He was sure that he had said that she had body-checked him. He was
sure he had said she knocked him off balance and that he had escorted her out.
....
That’s why it’s important for you to understand and see the difference
between what he said then and now. It’s not just words. Those words have
significant meaning because he was lying, first to the officers and then two days
ago to you.
(Tr., p.521, L.25–p.523, L.12, p.529, Ls.3–22 (emphasis added).)
The jury found Mr. Beyer guilty (R., p.138), and the court sentenced him to a unified
term of fifteen years, with four years fixed (R., pp.144–46).
(R., pp.148–50.)
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Mr. Beyer timely appealed.

ISSUES
I.

Considering that Mr. Beyer gave only a conflicting account of his altercation of
Ms. McConnell, and did not imply that the kids had recently fabricated their account of
the physical altercation, did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing Officer
Cooper to testify about what the kids told him on the day of the incident?

II.

Did the prosecutor commit misconduct amounting to fundamental error by telling the jury
that Mr. Beyer had lied to them and by misstating Mr. Beyer’s testimony?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Officer Cooper’s Testimony Regarding
What The Kids Told Him On The Day Of The Incident
“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the
trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” I.R.E. 801(c).
Hearsay is generally not admissible. I.R.E. 802. A statement is not hearsay if “[t]he declarant
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
the statement is . . . consistent with declarant’s testimony and is offered to rebut an express or
implied charge against declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive . . . .”
I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B).

Therefore, to be admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B), the out-of-court

statement must precede the alleged fabrication or improper influence or motive. Id.; State v. Joy,
155 Idaho 1, 13–14 (2013); State v. Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 894–95 (1999).
This Court reviews the district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Joy, 155 Idaho at 6. A district court acts within its decision if it (1) correctly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion
and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and
(3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.
When the prosecutor asked Officer Cooper to tell the jury what MM had told him she saw
that day, defense counsel objected to the testimony as hearsay. (Tr., p.445, Ls.6–8.) The
prosecutor responded that “this goes to rebut any claim or [sic] fabrication given the testimony of
the defendant that they may be fabricating their story now,” and that Mr. Beyer “was explaining
that the kids didn’t see, essentially, what they had saw because he laid down on their mom; he
didn’t have his hands on her neck or her arm at that point when [MM] came upstairs.”
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(Tr., p.445, Ls.10–18.) Defense counsel countered: “She’s already testified to what she’s seen.
Like every other case, we have factual discrepancies between witnesses.” (Tr., p.445, Ls.23–25.)
The court concluded that Mr. Beyer’s testimony “could be construed as an attempt to raise a
claim of recent fabrication,” and so Officer Cooper’s testimony was admissible “for the limited
purpose of allowing the jury to rebut if it believes that a claim of recent fabrication by our
witness of the testimony of the child witness, [MM].” (Tr., p.446, Ls.2–10.)
The district court abused its discretion. As an initial matter, Mr. Beyer did not impliedly
or expressly claim during his testimony that the kids had recently fabricated their testimony or
acted under an improper influence or motive.

See generally Tr., p.379, L.10–p.439, L.9;

see I.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). Instead, Mr. Beyer’s testimony simply recounted a different version of
events, particularly with respect to the physical altercation between him and Ms. McConnell.
(Tr., p.406, L.11–p.417, L.7.)

And to the extent that Mr. Beyer indicated some sort of

fabrication on the part of Ms. McConnell or her children, it was not with respect to their versions
of the physical altercation. Instead, it went to what happened after that—whether someone had
put some of his clothing back in the closet and moved his duffle bag before the police took their
photos. (Tr., p.419, L.22–p.421, L.4.) Officer Cooper’s testimony about the kids’ version of the
physical altercation does not go to whether someone placed clothing back in the closet or moved
Mr. Beyer’s duffle bag, and thus could not rebut any alleged implication of recent fabrication.
Finally, the statements the kids made to Officer Cooper on the day of the incident cannot be
construed as preceding any motive on the part of the kids to lie. See Trevino, 132 Idaho at 894–
95. The district court abused its discretion by admitting Officer Cooper’s testimony regarding
what the kids told him on the day of the incident.
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II.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Amounting To Fundamental Error By Telling The Jury
That Mr. Beyer Lied To Them And By Misstating Mr. Beyer’s Testimony
The U.S. and Idaho Constitutions provide that no person can be “deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; ID. CONST. art. I, § 13.
Due process requires that criminal trials are fundamentally fair. Schwartzmiller v. Winters,
99 Idaho 18, 19 (1978). Prosecutorial misconduct may so unfairly contaminate a trial that the
resulting conviction is a denial of due process. State v. Sanchez, 142 Idaho 309, 318 (Ct. App.
2005) (citing Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765 (1987)). “Where a prosecutor attempts to
secure a verdict on any factor other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the
evidence admitted during trial, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that
evidence, this impacts a defendant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial.” State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
Prosecutorial misconduct claims are grounded in constitutional principles over which this
Court exercises free review. See State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 361 (2013). When a defendant
challenges un-objected to misconduct on appeal, he must persuade the Court that the error:
“(1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists
(without the need for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 228. To show the error was not harmless, the defendant has “the
burden of proving there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the
trial.” Id. at 226.
The prosecutor in this case committed misconduct at closing by telling the jury that
Mr. Beyer had lied to them, and by misstating Mr. Beyer’s testimony. That misconduct deprived
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Mr. Beyer of his due process right to a fair trial, the misconduct is clear from the record, and
there is a reasonable possibility that the misconduct affected the verdict. This Court should
therefore vacate Mr. Beyer’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

A.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct Which Violated Mr. Beyer’s Due Process Right
To A Fair Trial By Appealing To The Emotions, Passions, And Prejudices Of The Jury,
And By Misstating Mr. Beyer’s Testimony
It is misconduct for a prosecutor to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the jury and

misstate the facts. State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, ___, 399 P.3d 804, 829 (2017) (stating that
“the prosecutor has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the facts and unnecessarily
inflammatory tactics”) (quoting State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 855, 871 (2014)); State v. Phillips,
144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007) (“appeals to emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through
use of inflammatory tactics are impermissible”).
The prosecutor in this case committed misconduct by appealing to the emotions,
passions, and prejudices of the jury, and by misstating Mr. Beyer’s testimony. In doing so, the
prosecutor relied on factors other than the applicable law and the facts adduced at trial, and thus
violated Mr. Beyer’s due process right to a fair trial. See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; IDAHO
CONST. art. I, § 13; Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.
During closing argument, the prosecutor spent a great deal of time telling the jury that
Mr. Beyer had made up his story after listening to the other witnesses’ testimony. And she went
a step farther by making it personal—he had lied to them: “And he tried to do it with you. You
know he tried to do it with you.” (Tr., p.522, Ls.6–7). “[H]e was lying, first to the officers and
then two days ago to you.” (Tr., p.529, Ls.21–22.)
The prosecutor further amplified this inflammatory argument by misstating Mr. Beyer’s
testimony while attempting to undermine his credibility. She asserted that, on cross examination,

12

Mr. Beyer had testified that “he didn’t remember saying [to Officer Cooper] that she had jumped
on his back.” (Tr., p.523, Ls.8–9.) That is wrong. When the prosecutor asked “isn’t it true that
you told Officer Cooper that she actually jumped on your back while you were in the closet?”
Mr. Beyer responded “Yes, I did say that. I was trying to describe it to him . . . .” (Tr., p.431,
Ls.14–19.) In fact, Mr. Beyer testified on direct examination that “the best way I can describe it
is a body check. I can feel her on my back and pushing me at the same time while I’m bent over.
. . .” (Tr., p.408, Ls.10–12.) The prosecutor also incorrectly told the jury that “[h]e was sure that
he had said that she had body-checked him.” (Tr., p.523, Ls.10–11.) Not so. When asked
whether he had used the term “body-check” with Officer Cooper, Mr. Beyer said, in no uncertain
terms, “[n]ot with Officer Cooper, that is correct.” (Tr., p.431, Ls.20–22.) He explained that he
described that he “felt her on my back and pushing at me at the same time,” and that the term
“body-check” best described what happened. (Tr., p.431, L.17–p.432, L.2.) The prosecutor
again misstated Mr. Beyer’s testimony when she said, “[h]e was sure he had said she knocked
him off balance and that he had escorted her out.” (Tr., p.523, Ls.11–12.) True, Mr. Beyer
testified that he was “pretty positive” that he told Officer Cooper that Ms. McConnell knocked
him off balance, but he also testified that he did not get the chance to explain to Officer Cooper
that he had pushed Ms. McConnell out of the room. (Tr., p.433, L.1–p.434, L.10.) Instead,
Officer Cooper asked for a quick synopsis of what happened, and when Mr. Beyer got to that
part of what happened, Officer Cooper cut him off. (Tr., p.434, Ls.10–18.) He was only able to
say that, as articulated by the prosecutor, he “was backing up, pushing her off,” and “I got
tangled up in her feet and we fell in the hallway.” (Tr., p.434, L.19–p.435, L.3.)
The prosecutor’s argument appealed to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury,
and also misstated Mr. Beyer’s testimony. Because the prosecutor attempted to secure a verdict
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on factors other than the law as set forth in the jury instructions and the evidence admitted during
trial, the prosecutor violated Mr. Beyer’s due process right to a fair trial.

B.

The Misconduct Plainly Exists In The Record
This prosecutorial misconduct is clear on the face of the record (see Tr., p.493, L.11–

p.529, L.22), and it was surely not a tactical decision by Mr. Beyer to not object, see Perry,
150 Idaho at 228. To be sure, no “reasonable trial strategist” would elect not to object to
misconduct which appeals to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury, and misstates the
defendant’s testimony in an effort to discredit him. See State v. Sutton, 151 Idaho 161, 167–68
(Ct. App. 2011) (concluding that mere speculation that a defendant strategically failed to object
was not sufficient to find the error did not plainly exist). Putting such damning suggestions to
the jury could be of no benefit to Mr. Beyer.

C.

The Misconduct Was Not Harmless
There is a reasonable possibility that the prosecutor’s misconduct at closing affected the

outcome of the trial. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. This case largely turned on credibility, and
the prosecutor’s misconduct sought to undercut Mr. Beyer’s credibility. The prosecutor appealed
to the emotions, passions, and prejudices of the jury by telling the jury that Mr. Beyer had lied to
them, and she misstated his testimony while attempting to show he was not credible. Putting
these statements together, there is a reasonable possibility this misconduct affected the verdict.
See State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 70–71 (2011) (explaining that the Court will take into
consideration whether or not the prosecutor is engaging in a pattern of misbehavior). The
prosecutor therefore committed misconduct amounting to fundamental error.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Beyer respectfully asks that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and remand
for a new trial.
DATED this 29th day of December, 2017.

_________/s/________________
MAYA P. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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